This paper studies how firms deal with business-unfriendly regulations that limit their operations. I first exploit a natural experiment to show that the ownership structure of a firm affects its degree of compliance with regulations, with publicly listed firms complying more than privately held ones. Then I show that this differential compliance imposes a burden on listed firms that helps explain the patterns of M&A activity in emerging markets. When the level of market regulations increases, private firms acquire listed ones and when market regulations decrease the results are reversed. I find that this effect is stronger for listed firms that are subject to stricter auditing and enforcement standards, suggesting that scrutiny plays an important role. Taken together, these results uncover an additional cost faced by listed companies, identify a new driver of M&A transactions in emerging markets, and show evidence that high levels of regulation lead to opaque corporate structures.
“Paying Attention to Banks: Evidence from Offshore Deposits”, joint with Matthieu Chavaz (Bank of England)
Retail depositors are often assumed to lack incentives to pay attention to bank risk. We use weekly Google search volumes and novel confidential data of deposit rates and inflows for UK banks
to test this notion. To control for deposit insurance, we compare the same deposit offered at the same time by a same group of banks in mainland UK vs. in the British Crown Dependencies, where
insurance is weaker. We find that riskier banks lose retail deposits when they receive heightened attention. These banks respond by increasing deposit rates. This effect is larger where deposit
insurance is weaker. Our findings suggest that attention to bank risk matters over and above risk itself.
Work in Progress
“Organized Crime and Firm Outcomes”, joint with Stefan Zeume
“Currency Composition of Firm Debt: Evidence from Peru”, joint with Charles Calomiris, Mauricio Larrain, and Daniel Wolfenzon